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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This case concerns the application of the Endangered Species 
Act of 1973 (“ESA”), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2012), as well as ques-
tions of constitutional law. Jurisdiction was proper in the district 
court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012). This Court has jurisdic-
tion over this appeal from the final order of the district court. 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 (2012); see also R. at 12.1 
 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR 
REVIEW 
I. Whether the ESA is a valid exercise of Congress’s Com-
merce power, as applied to a wholly intrastate population of 
an endangered butterfly. 
II. Whether Ms. Lear’s takings claim against the FWS is ripe 
despite having failed to apply for an Incidental Take Permit 
(ITP) under the ESA § 10, 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B). 
III. Whether the proper parcel for the takings analysis is the 
entirety of Lear Island. 
IV. Assuming the relevant parcel is the Cordelia Lot, whether 
the natural destruction of the butterfly habitat over ten 
years due to inaction by the landowner precludes a takings 
claim based on complete economic deprivation of value of 
the property. 
V. Assuming the relevant parcel is the Cordelia Lot, whether 
the ability to lease the property at a rate of $1,000 per an-
num until the Karner Blue’s habitat is naturally destroyed 
precludes Ms. Lear’s takings claim. 
VI. Assuming the relevant parcel is the Cordelia Lot, whether 
the public trust doctrine and equal footing doctrine preclude 
 
1. The citations “R. at __” refer to pages of the Final Problem, Revised on 
November 7, 2016. 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol8/iss1/3
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a takings claim based on the denial of a wetland fill permit 
by the county. 
VII. Assuming the relevant parcel is the Cordelia Lot, whether 
either FWS or Brittain County are liable for a taking when 
neither the federal or county regulation individually pre-
clude the development of a single-family residence. 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The mission of United States Fish and Wildlife Service 
(“FWS”) in administering the ESA is to promote the conservation 
and recovery of the planet’s rarest plants and animals. Pursuant 
to that mission, the FWS has restricted the use of a small plot of 
vacant land in New Union, which is the state’s last remaining isle 
of habitat for a rare species of butterfly, the Karner Blue. The list-
ing of the species and designation of the habitat in question went 
unchallenged for nearly twenty years. 
The FWS does not contend that Cordelia Lear (“Ms. Lear”), 
cannot build a home on the property at issue. FWS merely insists 
that Ms. Lear follow the well-established and flexible permitting 
process outlined in the ESA and accompanying regulations. The 
FWS is being forced to defend its decision not because it foreclosed 
development, but because the landowner seeks to circumscribe the 
longstanding permitting process designed to accommodate devel-
opment. 
A. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Karner Blue was listed as endangered on December 14, 
1992, and the property in question was designated as critical hab-
itat on the same date. R. at 5; Determination of Endangered Status 
of the Karner Blue Butterfly, 57 Fed. Reg. 59,236 (Dec. 14, 1992) (to 
be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). Ms. Lear owns a single ten-acre 
parcel on the northern tip of Lear Island, in the state of New Union; 
this parcel is referred to herein as the “Cordelia Lot.” R. at 2, 4. 
The Cordelia Lot is the last Karner Blue habitat in New Union. Id. 
at 5-6. The lot consists primarily of an access strip and a nine-acre 
open field. Id. at 2. Contiguous to the lot is a cove containing one-
3
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acre of emergent cattail marsh that was historically open water 
and used as a boat landing. Id. 
Lear Island has a surface area of about 1,000 acres and is lo-
cated on a large interstate lake, which was traditionally used for 
interstate navigation. Id. at 1. In 1803, Congress granted the en-
tirety of the island to Cornelius Lear, Ms. Lear’s ancestor.2 Id. 
Since then, the Lears have used the island as a homestead, farm, 
and hunting and fishing grounds. Id. at 2. In 1965, King James 
Lear (“James Lear”), Ms. Lear’s father, subdivided the island into 
three separate lots: “the 550-acre Goneril Lot, the 440-acre Regan 
Lot, and the 10-acre Cordelia Lot.” Id. James Lear deeded each lot 
to one of his daughters, including Ms. Lear, and reserved a life es-
tate for himself. Id. While James Lear constructed a residence on 
the Regan, the Lears intentionally kept the Cordelia Lot open and 
mowed from 1965 onward; the family even refers to the lot as “The 
Heath.”3 Id. Following her father’s death in 2005, Ms. Lear took 
possession of the Cordelia Lot in 2005. Id. 
1. The Cordelia Lot is Essential Habitat for the 
Karner Blue. 
Decades of annual mowing, coupled with the Cordelia Lot’s 
placement near the edge of a successional forest, created the per-
fect habitat for Karner Blue butterflies. Id. at 5-6. This is due 
largely to the bountiful population of blue lupine flowers, which 
thrive in the sandy soil and are the Karner Blue’s primary food 
source. Id. at 5. Importantly, Karner Blues do not migrate, and due 
to their relatively short flight distance, the butterfly’s entire lifecy-
cle occurs within a single flower patch. Id. at 6. The species’ eggs 
overwinter onsite and hatch in the spring; once hatched, the larva 
can only survive by feeding on the leaves of blue lupine flowers. Id. 
 
2. “The 1803 grant included title in fee simple absolute to all of Lear Island 
and to “all lands under water within a 300-foot radius of the shoreline of said 
island,” as well as an additional grant of lands under water in the shallow strait 
separating Lear Island from the mainland.” R. at 1-2. 
3. “Heath” means “a tract of wasteland” or “an extensive area of rather level 
open uncultivated land . . . .” Merriam-Webster, Heath, Merriam-Webster.com 
(Nov. 27, 2016), http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/heath. 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol8/iss1/3
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at 6. Eventually, while still attached to a lupine flower, the larva 
undergoes metamorphosis4 and resets the life-cycle. Id. 
Because the Cordelia Lot is on an Island, this population is 
isolated. Id. at 5-6. The endangered status of the Karner Blue 
means that any development of the Cordelia Lot that disturbs the 
lupine fields will require permission from the FWS in the form of 
an Incidental Take Permit (“ITP”). Id. An ITP would be required 
for the proposed development, even if the Cordelia Lot was not crit-
ical habitat. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1). However, without annual mow-
ing, the Karner Blue habitat will naturally disappear within ten 
years. Id. at 7. 
2. The Failure to Seek an ITP Manufactured this 
Controversy. 
For the first time since being deeded the Cordelia Lot in 1965 
Ms. Lear decided to build a home in 2012, id. at 5-6, making her 
decision with full knowledge of the restrictions imposed by the ESA 
twenty years earlier. Id. In a letter dated May 15, 2012, the FWS 
advised Ms. Lear that any disturbance of the lupine fields, other 
than continued mowing, would constitute a “take” of an endan-
gered species. Id. at 6. Additionally, Ms. Lear was invited to apply 
for an ITP under § 10 of the ESA. Id. The development of a Habitat 
Conservation Plan (“HCP”) and Environmental Assessment is a 
part of that application process. Id. An acceptable HCP requires 
offsetting any disturbance to the lupine fields by creating contigu-
ous habitat at a one-to-one ratio and maintaining the status quo 
on the remainder of the lot. Id. 
Ms. Lear elected not to seek an ITP or create an HCP. Id. at 6-
7. Presumably, she based this decision on the advice of a private 
consultant, who estimated the net-costs of the ITP application as 
 
4. Metamorphosis is defined as “a typically marked and more or less abrupt 
developmental change in the form or structure of an animal (as a butterfly or a 
frog) occurring subsequent to birth or hatching.” Merriam-Webster, Metamorpho-
sis, Merriam-Webster.com (Nov. 27, 2016), http://www.merriam-webster.com/dic-
tionary/metamorphosis. 
5
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$150,000.5 Id. Instead, Ms. Lear pursued an Alternative Develop-
ment Proposal (“ADP”), which if approved, would facilitate devel-
opment through filling of one-half acre of marshland to create a 
building site without disturbing any of the protected habitat. Id. 
The FWS took no position on the proposed filling and no federal 
approval is required.6 Id. at 7. 
In order to proceed with the ADP, Ms. Lear is required to ob-
tain approval from Brittain County, pursuant to the county’s 1982 
Wetland Preservation Law. Id. Ms. Lear filed her application with 
the County in August 2013. Id. The County denied the application 
on the basis “that permits to fill wetlands would only be granted 
for a water-dependent use, and that a residential home site was 
not a water-dependent use.” Id. 
B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Ms. Lear commenced this action with the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of New Union against the FWS and Brit-
tain County in February 2014, alleging that application of the ESA 
in this case is unconstitutional and seeking compensation for a reg-
ulatory taking under the theory of complete economic deprivation. 
Id. at 8. Following a seven-day bench trial, the Honorable Judge 
Romulus N. Remus entered a judgment for the court. Id. at 12. The 
court held that the ESA was constitutional as applied, but it found 
that the combination of state and federal regulations constituted a 
regulatory taking requiring compensation. Id. at 11. Both the FWS 
and Brittain County timely filed a Notice of Appeal on June 9, 
2016, and Ms. Lear filed a Notice to Cross Appeal on June 10, 2016. 
Id. at 1; Fed. R. App. P. 3(a), 4(a). This Court entered an order 
granting all parties’ Notice of Appeal on September 1, 2016. R. at 
1. 
 
5. “The fair market value of the Cordelia Lot without any restrictions that 
would prevent development of a single-family house on the lot is $100,000. Prop-
erty taxes on the Cordelia Lot are $1,500 annually.” Id. at 7. Ms. Lear has not 
reassessed the property with restrictions. Id.  
6. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers considers the cove to be “non-naviga-
ble” for purposes of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899. R. at 7. Therefore, “be-
cause construction of residential dwellings involving one half-acre or less of fill is 
authorized by U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Nationwide Permit 29, see Issuance 
of Nationwide Permit for Single-Family Housing, 60 Fed. Reg. 38,650 (July 27, 
1995), no federal approvals would be required for this project.” Id. 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol8/iss1/3
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
First, application of the ESA to an intrastate population of an 
endangered butterflies is constitutional. The “take” prohibition in 
§ 9 of the ESA is one facet of a general regulatory scheme that tar-
gets interstate trade and transport of endangered species. Moreo-
ver, the effects of intrastate land development and the potential 
extinction of a species both have the potential to substantially af-
fect interstate commerce in the aggregate. As such, this Court 
should follow sister circuits and hold that applying the ESA in this 
case is a constitutional under the Commerce Clause. 
Second, because Ms. Lear did not apply for an ITP and the 
FWS has taking no final action on her proposed development her 
claim against the FWS is not ripe. While there are recognized ex-
ceptions to the finality requirement, none apply to Ms. Lear be-
cause the FWS did not indicate that her application would be de-
nied and the cost of applying does not, itself, establish futility. As 
such, the district court’s erroneous ripeness holding should be re-
versed. 
Third, assuming the claim is ripe, when determining whether 
a taking has occurred, this Court should focus on the entire 1,000-
acre Lear Island, not Ms. Lear’s 10-acre lot. From 1803 to 2005, 
Lear Island was managed as one contiguous unit, without regard 
to who held title. Also, because the Lears intentionally kept the 
Cordelia Lot vacant and mowed from 1965 to the present day, and 
because Ms. Lear had no development plans until twenty years af-
ter the Karner Blue was listed and six years after taking posses-
sion of the lot, application of the ESA did not adversely affect her 
reasonable investment backed interests. 
Fourth, a categorical taking also is precluded because the re-
strictions imposed by the ESA are temporary in nature. The ESA 
will cease to apply if Ms. Lear discontinues landscaping of her 
property, thereby causing the natural cessation of the Karner 
Blue’s habitat within ten years. Furthermore, the lot retain pre-
sent economic value as recreational land that as it can be leased 
for $1,000 annually for butterfly viewing and used in the same 
manner that it has been since 1965. 
Fifth, Brittain County’s denial of a wetland fill permit does not 
give rise to a takings claim. Under the public trust doctrine, the 
7
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State of New Union retains a navigable servitude over the under-
water lands surrounding Lear Island. Also, because all waters sur-
rounding Lear Island were navigable in fact when New Union be-
came a state, pursuant to the equal-footing doctrine New Union 
hold superior title to those lands. These background principles of 
property law allow the county to regulate the submerged lands 
without giving rise to a taking. 
Lastly, the district court erred in applying joint liability. Joint 
liability is applied in tort context to punish bad actors who cause a 
foreseeable, indivisible harm. Conversely, a sovereign exercising 
its presumed legal right to appropriate or regulate land is not a 
bad actor. Joint liability is also inappropriate when the alleged in-
juries caused by the ESA and County regulations can be appor-
tioned to two distinct government entities. 
 
ARGUMENTS 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The extent of Congress’s powers under the Commerce Clause, 
takings claims under the Fifth Amendment, as well as questions of 
ripeness, are questions of law subject to de novo review. Lucas v. 
S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1007 (1992); United States v. 
Ambert, 561 F.3d 1202, 1205 (11th Cir. 2009). The district court’s 
factual conclusions are reviewed for clear error. United States v. 
El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467, 577 (5th Cir. 2011). 
I. THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT IS PROPERLY 
APPLIED TO A PURELY INTRASTATE 
POPULATION OF BUTTERFIES WHEN SUCH 
APPLICATION IS PART OF A GENERAL 
REGULATORY SCHEME AND THE ACTIVITIES 
REGULATED HAVE A SUBSTANTIAL 
AGGREGATE EFFECT ON INTERSTATE 
COMMERCE. 
Congress has the power to regulate intrastate activities that 
“have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.” United States 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol8/iss1/3
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v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995). This power is derived from Ar-
ticle I of the Constitution; “Congress shall have power . . . [t]o reg-
ulate commerce . . . among the several states,” and to make “laws 
which shall be necessary and proper” to carry out that power. U.S. 
Const. art. I, § 8. The commerce power allows Congress “to pre-
scribe the rule[s] by which commerce is to be governed[, and] may 
be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, 
other than are prescribed in the constitution.” Gibbons v. Ogden, 
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824). Accordingly, Congress may enact 
general regulatory statutes that burden purely intrastate activi-
ties bearing a substantial relation to commerce. Gonzales v. Raich, 
545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005). 
Lower courts have derived four factors from Lopez and United 
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), which must be considered 
in determining whether a law has a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce: 
1. Whether the statute has anything to do with “commerce or any 
sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define 
those terms;” 
2. Whether the statute contains an “express jurisdictional ele-
ment;” 
3. Whether the “legislative history contains express congressional 
findings regarding the effects upon interstate commerce;” and 
4. Whether the link between the regulated activity and the effect 
on interstate commerce is too “attenuated.” 
San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Salazar, 638 F.3d 1163, 
1174 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal citations omitted). It follows that 
“when a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to 
commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances arising 
under that statute [are] of no consequence.” Raich, 545 U.S. at 17. 
Under the well-established principle of Lopez and Morrison, 
the ESA is a valid exercise of Congress’s authority pursuant to the 
Commerce Clause, even when applied to purely intrastate popula-
tions, for two reasons. First, the text and legislative history of the 
ESA demonstrate that it is a comprehensive regulatory scheme 
and preserving of biodiversity directly impacts interstate com-
merce. Second, the ESA regulates activities that have substantial 
aggregate effects on interstate commerce, even when the specific 
conduct is intrastate in nature. 
9
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A. The Text and Legislative History of the ESA Show 
That Congress Intended to Create a 
Comprehensive Regulatory Scheme and That 
Preserving Biodiversity is Directly Related to 
Interstate Commerce. 
The purpose of the ESA is to “provide a means whereby the 
ecosystems upon which endangered species . . . depend may be con-
served.” 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b). Once a species is listed pursuant to 
§ 4 of the ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1533, the unauthorized “take” of that 
species is prohibited by § 9. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B). “Take” is fur-
ther defined by statute, “to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, 
wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any 
such conduct,” 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19), and by regulation, “harm” in-
cludes “an act which actually kills or injures wildlife. . . . in-
clud[ing] significant habitat modification or degradation where it 
actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential 
behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering.” 50 
C.F.R. § 17.3 (2012). The “take” provision of § (9)(a)(B) must be con-
sidered in light of the ESA’s entire regulatory scheme. 
As the Court stated when upholding the federal Controlled 
Substances Act (CSA), 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq., as applied to purely 
intrastate marijuana cultivation, Congress may burden intrastate 
activities when “a general regulatory statute bears a substantial 
relation to commerce.” Raich, 545 U.S. at 17. The Court specifically 
noted that the CSA is a nationwide “comprehensive regulatory re-
gime specifically designed to regulate which controlled substances 
can be utilized for medicinal purposes, and in what manner.” Id. at 
27. While application of the CSA burdened only intrastate cultiva-
tion of marijuana in Raich, its application could not be severed 
from the interstate nature of the overall statutory scheme. Id. 
Similar to the CSA, the “take” prohibition in § 9(a)(1)(B) is a 
small part of a regulatory scheme that directly regulates commerce 
among the states. This Court must read § 9(a)(1)(B) in pari materia 
with all activities that are regulated under § 9, such as the import, 
export, or sale of listed species in interstate or foreign commerce. 
See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1538(a)(1)(A)-(G). In every subsection of (9)(a), ex-
cept subsection (a)(1)(B), the “take” provision, expressly prohibits 
or regulates activities directly tied to interstate commerce. The 
subsection at issue is but a single cog in a comprehensive regula-
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol8/iss1/3
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tory machine. Under this Court’s reasoning in Raich, a general reg-
ulatory statute targeting interstate activities is not unconstitu-
tional merely because its application burdens some intrastate ac-
tivities. 545 U.S. at 17. 
The legislative history accompanying the ESA shows that Con-
gress intended to regulate ecosystems and markets, not just indi-
vidual species. The House Report accompanying the ESA ex-
plained that as human development pushes species toward 
extinction, “we threaten their—and our own—genetic heritage. 
The value of this genetic heritage is, quite literally, incalculable.” 
H.R. Rep. No. 93–412, at 143 (1973) (to accompany H.R. 37). Con-
gress recognized an inherent value in preserving biodiversity for 
the simple reason that such lifeforms “are potential resources.” Id. 
at 144. The report further stated: 
  Honesty compels us to admit that steps taken by H.R. 37 to 
close the U.S. market to trade in endangered and threatened spe-
cies may not be sufficient . . . Passage of this legislation is, how-
ever, of importance—both because the United States is an im-
portant market, and because of the precedent it will create. 
. . . . 
The basic purpose of the Act is . . . to provide a means whereby 
ecosystems upon which endangered species . . . depend may be 
conserved, protected or restored. . . . 
Id. at 144-45 (emphasis added). Congress recognized endangered 
species, themselves, as instruments of commerce, and endorsed the 
protection of entire ecosystems. States are even encouraged to be 
stricter than the ESA requires, if necessary. Id. at 146. It simply 
cannot be said that Congress intended federal agencies to be pow-
erless when one species is so threatened that its entire population 
is bound within the borders of a single state. 
B. This Court Should Follow Other Circuits that 
Have Unanimously Upheld the Application of the 
ESA to Activities that Impact Purely Intrastate 
Species. 
This Court should hold, as other circuits have, that the ESA is 
substantially related to interstate commerce and is constitutional 
as applied to intrastate species. Following Gonzales v. Raich, when 
11
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“a statute is challenged under the Commerce Clause, courts must 
evaluate the aggregate effect of the statute, rather than an isolated 
application, in determining whether the statute relates to ‘com-
merce or any sort of economic enterprise.’” Salazar, 638 F.3d at 
1175 (upholding the application of § 9 to a purely intrastate smelt 
population). The purpose and aggregate effect of the ESA make 
clear that the statute is related to numerous economic enterprises. 
In Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), the Supreme Court 
held that purely intrastate activities may be regulated by Congress 
due to the potential aggregate impact of the conduct on interstate 
commerce. Id. at 133. In Wickard, federal law imposed a penalty 
on the harvest of excess quantities of wheat, even if the excess was 
solely for intrastate, on-the-farm use. Id. at 116-17. The Court up-
held the law under the Commerce Clause, because if one consid-
ered the potential of the aggregated impact of the personal usage 
of every farmer in the country, those activities could impact inter-
state commerce. Id. at 130-31. The Court followed the same prin-
ciple in Raich, where it noted that intrastate cultivation of mariju-
ana has the potential for substantial aggregate interstate 
movement of narcotics. 545 U.S. at 29. The same logic is applicable 
to the ESA. 
Numerous recent court decisions uphold the application of the 
ESA to intrastate species as constitutional. The D.C. Circuit, for 
example, upheld regulations that halted a commercial develop-
ment project due to the potential taking of an intrastate population 
of the Delhi Sands flower-loving fly. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders 
v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1059-60 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (hereinafter 
“NAHB”). The court reasoned, “Congress contemplated protecting 
endangered species through regulation of land and its develop-
ment. . . . Such regulation, apart from the characteristics or range 
of the specific endangered species involved, has a plain and sub-
stantial effect on interstate commerce.” NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1059. 
Noting that Congress intended to protect ecosystems, the court 
held that application of the ESA was proper because the burdened 
activity, land development, “asserts a substantial economic effect 
on interstate commerce.” Id. 
The ESA primarily regulates activities of a economic nature, 
and its application to intrastate activities are justified by reference 
to interstate commerce. Unlike the Violence Against Women Act, 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol8/iss1/3
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in Morrison, or the Gun Control Regulation, in Lopez, the ESA di-
rectly impacts interstate commerce. As the district court correctly 
noted, the actual activity burdened in this case—land development 
and construction of a residential home—”is clearly an economic ac-
tivity, involving as it does the purchase of building materials and 
the hiring of carpenters and contractors.” R. at 8. Even assuming 
Ms. Lear could build her home using purely intrastate resources, 
the aggregate effects of such activities impact interstate commerce. 
This case is substantively no different from Wickard and NAHB. 
The regulation of grain grown solely for on-the-farm use in Wick-
ard was permissible because of the potential aggregate effect on 
national agricultural trade. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 131-32. Halting 
commercial development because of an intrastate insect was per-
missible because of the potential aggregate impact of habitat de-
struction from land development on interstate commerce. NAHB, 
130 F.3d at 1059. Similarly, restricting Ms. Lear’s residential de-
velopment to prevent the destruction of an intrastate insect is per-
missible because of the aggregate impacts of habitat destruction 
and land development on a national scale. 
Numerous aspects of biodiversity, and the potential recovery 
of endangered species, are also related to interstate commerce. For 
example, a species might become endangered because of “overuti-
lization for commercial . . . purposes.” 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1533(a)(1)(B); see also Trout Unlimited v. Lohn, 559 F.3d 946 
(9th Cir. 2009). Moreover, “even where the species . . . has no cur-
rent commercial value, Congress may regulate under its Com-
merce Clause authority to ‘prevent the destruction of biodiversity 
and thereby protect the current and future interstate commerce 
that relies on it.’” Conservation Force v. Manning, 301 F.3d 985, 
994 n. 8 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1052) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). The Eleventh Circuit recognized that 
“[b]ecause Congress could not anticipate which species might have 
undiscovered scientific and economic value, it made sense to pro-
tect all those species that are endangered.” Alabama-Tombigbee 
Rivers Coal, 477 F.3d 1250, 1274-75 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing GDF 
Realty Invs, Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 632 (5th Cir. 2003)). In 
fact, species diversity, itself, is often directly related to commerce, 
as “half of the most commonly prescribed medicines are derived 
from plant and animal species.” Alabama-Tombigbee, 477 F.3d at 
1273. 
13
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While a particular species may not yet be an essential instru-
ment of commerce, it can become one as populations recover and 
scientific knowledge develops. It may very well be that further sci-
entific advancement will reveal economic values of the Karner Blue 
that mankind is as of yet unaware of. The aggregate effects dis-
cussed above and the potential of scientific advancement are addi-
tional factors bringing the ESA within Congress’s Commerce 
Clause authority. 
II. MS. LEAR’S TAKINGS CLAIM AGAINST THE FWS 
IS NOT RIPE BECAUSE SHE HAS NOT APPLIED 
FOR AN INCIDENTAL TAKE PERMIT AND THE 
FWS HAS NOT TAKEN A FINAL ACTION IN THIS 
MATTER. 
The Fifth Amendment assumes the power of government to 
appropriate lands for public purposes. U.S. Const. amend V. How-
ever, before a Fifth Amendment takings claim ripens, the govern-
ment action at issue must be final, unless the petitioner proves 
that awaiting finality is futile. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 
U.S. 606, 618-19, 626 (2001); Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 
136, 140 (1967). The finality requirement allows a court to deter-
mine the precise scope of development and use permitted on the 
land. Morris v. United States, 392 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
Each circuit addressing alleged takings claims arising from appli-
cation of the ESA has held that the plaintiff must apply for, and be 
denied, an ITP before the claim ripens. See, e.g., Morris, 392 F.3d 
at 1376-77 (holding that the failure to seek an ITP for a proposed 
logging operation precluded ripeness, despite the cost and complex-
ity of the process); Acorn Land, L.L.C. v. Balt Co., 402 F App’x 809, 
814 (4th Cir. 2010). The “finality” requirement is compelled be-
cause determining whether a taking has occurred “requires know-
ing to a reasonable degree of certainty what limitations the agency 
will, pursuant to regulations, place on the property.” Morris, 392 
F.3d at 1376. Thus, “when an agency provides procedures for ob-
taining a final decision, a takings claim is unlikely to be ripe until 
the property owner complies with those procedures.” Id. (citing 
Greenbrier v. United States, 193 F.3d 1348, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). 
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A. The Takings Claim is Not Ripe Because Ms. Lear 
Did Not Apply For an ITP. 
The case of Morris v. United States is analogous to the matter 
currently before the Court and is illustrative for the ripeness anal-
ysis. In Morris, the plaintiff sought to log timber on a parcel, but it 
became clear that both a HCP and ITP would be necessary. Id. at 
1374. The plaintiffs argued that their takings claim was ripe for 
review because the cost of the ITP application process “is greater 
than the value of their property, and the government has no mean-
ingful discretion to change those facts.” Id. Using their own expert, 
the plaintiffs estimated the costs of the application, but their figure 
was not persuasive to the court. Id. The court rejected their argu-
ment, reasoning that “the agency has discretion to assist the plain-
tiffs with the application.” Id. at 1377. Absent an application, the 
court had no way of knowing what impact on costs the agency’s 
discretionary assistance would have, thus the claim was not ripe. 
Id. 
As in Morris, “the assumption that the cost of applying for the 
ITP is fixed and knowable is simply incorrect.” See id. The ESA 
requires Ms. Lear to create an HCP as a part of her ITP applica-
tion, just like the Morris plaintiffs, which she argues will cost more 
than the Cordelia Lot is worth. R. at 6. Nevertheless, the FWS is 
required to provide technical assistance to an ITP applicant and 
federal guidance documents strongly encourage applicants to seek 
this assistance. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior and Fish and Wildlife 
Serv., Habitat Conservation Planning and Incidental Take Permit 
Processing Handbook, Ch. 2 (Nov. 4, 1996) (“Handbook”); see also 
Morris, 392 F.3d at 1377. As in Morris, the actual “cost of an ITP 
application is unknowable until the agency has had some mean-
ingful opportunity to exercise its discretion to assist in the pro-
cess.” 392 F.3d at 1377. Ms. Lear made no attempt to apply for an 
ITP, there has been no enforcement action, and the FWS has not 
issued a final decision. R. at 6. Despite Ms. Lear’s private esti-
mates, the actual cost of the application process cannot be known 
until the agency has the opportunity to assist and make a final 
determination. Therefore, Ms. Lear’s claim is not ripe. 
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B. The Recognized Exceptions to the Finality 
Requirement of the Ripeness Doctrine Do Not 
Excuse Ms. Lear’s Failure to Apply For an ITP. 
Despite the district court’s conclusion to the contrary, none of 
the exceptions to the finality requirement save Ms. Lear’s claim. 
Generally, the finality requirement is only excused where the gov-
ernment has made clear that no application of any kind will be 
granted. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 621. A few cases have indicated, 
in dicta, that “where the procedure to acquire a permit is so bur-
densome as to effectively deprive plaintiffs of their property 
rights,” a takings claim may ripen. Lakewood Assocs. v. United 
States, 45 Fed. Cl. 320, 333 (1999) (citing Loveladies Harbor, Inc. 
v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 381, 386-387 (1988) (hereinafter “Love-
ladies I”), aff’d 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).7 However, neither 
circumstance is presented by the instant facts. 
The first basis for an exception is not supported by the record. 
The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the “futility 
exception simply serves to protect property owners from being re-
quired to submit multiple applications when the manner in which 
the first application was rejected makes it clear that no project will 
be approved.” Howard W. Heck & Assocs. v. United States, 134 F.3d 
1468, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). The FWS gave no indication that it would deny Ms. 
Lear’s ITP application; rather it has merely stated the kinds of con-
ditions that are likely necessary. R. at 6. The letter received by Ms. 
Lear on May 15, 2012, suggests that if she complied with the re-
quirements and followed the procedures of the Handbook, the FWS 
would likely grant her permit. Id.; see also Blaine I. Green, The 
Endangered Species Act and Fifth Amendment Takings: Constitu-
tional Limits of Species Protection, 15 Yale J. on Reg. 329, 370 
(1998) (noting that completed HCP applications are usually ap-
proved). Accordingly, Ms. Lear’s ripeness argument hinges and fal-
ters on the contention that the ITP application process is overly 
burdensome. See R. at 9. 
 
7. In the hypothetical situation where Ms. Lear actually applied for an ITP 
and the agency failed to respond in a timely manner, then her claim may have 
ripened. See Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States, 296 F.3d 1339, 1349-50 (Fed. 
Cir. 2002) (“Absent denial of the permit, only an extraordinary delay in the per-
mitting process can give rise to a compensable taking.”). 
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The application process is not unduly burdensome merely be-
cause it carries substantial costs or that the conditions will incon-
venience Ms. Lear. While the Court of Federal Claims has recog-
nized the unduly burdensome exception as a means of proving 
futility, it has never addressed what degree of hardship is suffi-
cient. See Hage v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 147, 164 (1996) (hold-
ing that plaintiffs had the right to present proof at trial to establish 
that requirements were unduly burdensome). This Court should 
follow Morris, which rejected the contention that costs alone make 
the procedural requirements unduly burdensome. See 392 F.3d at 
1377-78. 
The costs associated with the ITP and the requirement of cre-
ating contiguous lupine fields are not unreasonable. As the Lake-
wood court recognized, while actions required to receive a permit 
may be burdensome, those that are necessary for the permitting 
process to function are not unduly so. See 45 Fed. Cl. at 333. The 
requirement for the creation of contiguous habitat is a necessary 
burden, which is necessary to fulfill the ESA’s purpose—the 
preservation and recovery of populations of endangered species. 
See 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b). Further, even if Ms. Lear’s sister, the 
owner of the contiguous land, may not assist compensation free, 
see R. at 6, there is nothing to stop Ms. Lear from paying her sister 
for the right to utilize adjacent land. Furthermore, the fact that 
Ms. Lear proposed an ADP that has no impact on the protected 
Karner habitat, demonstrates the availability of creative and fea-
sible alternatives under federal law. 
This case is also distinguishable from Loveladies I, 15 Cl. Ct. 
at 381, where the court found an application process to be unduly 
burdensome. In Loveladies I, the only means by which the proposed 
riverfront construction could move forward was by proving one 
narrow exception to the Rivers and Harbors Act, whereby the rule 
could be overridden. 15 Cl. Ct. at 387. The Court of Claims noted 
that where the regulation sought to prevent pollution and mitigate 
interference with navigation in the harbor, and where the proposed 
activity was terrestrial construction, it was unduly burdensome to 
force the plaintiff to seek a non-existent variance from the regula-
tion. Id. Significant to the court’s conclusion was that the proposed 
terrestrial construction would not interfere with navigation. See id. 
at 387-88. 
17
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Unlike Loveladies I, the proposed residential development in 
this case directly affects the very thing that the ESA seeks to pre-
vent—the destruction of habitat for an endangered species. The 
creation of a HCP and acquisition of an ITP are provisions designed 
specifically for situations where development cannot move forward 
because of the ESA. Such procedures are essential to administra-
tion of the ESA. While these procedures present a financial burden, 
the procedures are not an unreasonable obstacle given the nature 
of the regulation and the proposed development. Accordingly, this 
Court should decline to reach the merits of Ms. Lear’s takings 
claim because it is not ripe for review. 
III. ASSUMING THE TAKINGS CLAIM IS RIPE, THE 
DENOMINATOR IN THE TAKINGS FRACTION IS 
ALL OF LEAR ISLAND BECAUSE THE ISLAND 
HAS BEEN TREATED AS ONE CONTIGUOUS 
UNIT SINCE ITS CONVEYANCE. 
This case presents a classic denominator problem in takings 
law; as such, this Court should not automatically assume that the 
proper denominator in the takings fraction is the burdened parcel. 
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1018. The general rule is that properties are 
evaluated as a whole, and temporal or interest based divisions are 
not permitted. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan-
ning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 327 (2002). Moving forward, this Court 
should adopt the flexible approach endorsed by several other 
courts, which allows for consideration of the factual nuances of 
each case. See Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 
1171, 1181 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (hereinafter “Loveladies II”); 
Machipongo Land & Coal Co. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 799 A.2d 751, 
768 (Pa. 2002). 
The justification for a flexible approach is that if the court 
merely focuses on change of title, it will underestimate the crea-
tiveness and ingenuity of developers seeking a windfall. Julian C. 
Juergensmeyer and Thomas R. Roberts, Land Use Planning and 
Development Regulation Law 438 (2nd Ed. 2007). Several factors 
that are relevant under such an analysis include the following: (1) 
“the dates of acquisition, the extent to which the proposed parcel 
has been treated as a single unit, . . . the timing of transfers . . . in 
light of the developing regulatory environment; [(2)] the owner’s 
investment backed-expectations; and [(3)] the landowner’s plans 
18https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol8/iss1/3
  
88 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 8 
for development.” Machipongo, 799 A.2d. at 768. See also Love-
ladies II, 28 F.3d at 1179. Applying these factors and despite the 
change of ownership, Lear Island as a whole is the proper parcel 
for a takings analysis. 
A similar application of this analysis is relevant here. In Del-
tona Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d 1184, 1193 (1981); cert. de-
nied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982), plaintiffs took title to a large swath of 
land in 1964 with plans to develop the property. While some devel-
opment had already occurred, certain segments of the original ac-
quisition became subject to additional regulations in 1970. Id. at 
1192-93. Because the plaintiffs were on notice that all proposed de-
velopment was subject to permit approval, the court forbade sever-
ing the affected parcels for purposes of the takings analysis. Id. 
The application of additional regulation was not a taking because 
only a small fraction of the total acquisition was deprived of value. 
Id. 
The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals reached a different con-
clusion in Loveladies II, where it rejected a bright line rule. 28 F.3d 
at 1180-82. The court applied the proffered flexible approach and 
concluded that a portion of the property owned by petitioners 
should be excluded from the takings fraction. Id. Of the original 
250 acres purchased, all land developed prior to enacting the 1982 
regulations was excluded from the denominator because the state 
made no attempt to regulate this property during the prior twenty-
four years of development. Id. Of the remaining fifty-one acres, the 
court excluded thirty-eight and one-half acres from the denomina-
tor, because that land had been promised to the state in exchange 
for the permit sought. Id. at 1181. Therefore, the court was left 
with only the land for which a permit was sought as the taking 
fraction’s denominator. Id. While the Loveladies I and II analysis 
is sound, the facts of this case do not dictate the same result. 
Despite the recent transfer of title, Lear Island, which consists 
of 1,000 acres of above water land, was treated as one continuous 
unit from the date of conveyance until as late as 2012. Since 1803, 
the Lear family has always held legal title to the entire island, and 
the entire island has been used for homesteading, farming, and 
hunting. Id. at 4. While the island was subdivided into three lots 
in 1965, the entire island remained in the possession, and under 
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the management, of James Lear until his death in 2005.8 Id. at 4. 
In fact, the Lear sisters did not take possession of their deeded 
property until 2005. Id. From 2005 to 2012, the property was still 
managed as one unit, including the annual mowing of the ten-acre 
Cordelia Lot, which began in 1965. R. at 4-5. As this historic recol-
lection demonstrates, the Lear family managed the entirety of Lear 
Island as one unit of land for over 200 years, without regard to 
which individual actually held title. 
History is significant in light of developing regulations. Nota-
bly, it was the annual mowing of the Cordelia Lot since 1965 that 
created the Karner Blue habitat. Id. at 4-5. While the butterfly was 
listed, and its habitat designated, in 1992, the Lears continued to 
maintain the annual mowing schedule until James Lear died in 
2005. The mowing has been continued to this day. Id. at 4-6. Sim-
ilar to the developers in Deltona, Ms. Lear should be presumed to 
have awareness that any potential residential development will re-
quire normal building permits. More importantly, she was aware, 
from at least 1992 onward, that development of the Cordelia Lot 
would be subject to the restrictions of the ESA. Id. at 5-6. Despite 
Ms. Lear’s awareness, she never changed her plans or sought dif-
ferential treatment until 2012, twenty years after regulations bur-
dened the lot. Id. at 7. 
Ms. Lear’s investment backed interests or hypothetical devel-
opment plans do not favor treating the Cordelia Lot as the denom-
inator for the takings claim. It is relevant to note that Ms. Lear did 
not purchase the Cordelia Lot with the intent of development; ra-
ther, she inherited the property at no cost. In addition, unlike the 
plaintiffs in Deltona or Loveladies I and II, Ms. Lear did not have 
plans to develop the Cordelia Lot, or any other part of Lear Island, 
when she took title in 1965, or possession in 2005. While the 1965 
Brittain County Planning Board speculated that residential devel-
opment would be permitted under the then existing zoning desig-
nation, no further actions were taken. Unlike the plaintiffs in the 
Loveladies cases, there is no historic pattern of development, which 
later became subject to regulation. Rather, the uses of Lear Island 
as a homestead and hunting and recreational land continued, un-
interrupted, from the 1965 subdivision until 2012. It was not until 
 
8. James Lear retained a life estate in each subdivided parcel, thus giving 
him the legal right to retain possession until his death. R. at 4. 
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twenty years after the ESA first burdened the Cordelia Lot that 
any development plans were proposed. R. at 4-5. 
Despite the District Court’s conclusion to the contrary, R. at 9-
8, mere transfer of title does not conclusively determine what prop-
erty should constitute the denominator of the takings analysis in 
this case. The historic use of Lear Island as one contiguous unit, 
the retention of title within one family, and the lack of any devel-
opment-oriented investment backed interests until 2012 all weigh 
in favor of treating the entire island as the relevant parcel. Looking 
to the entirety of Lear Island a categorical taking is precluded be-
cause only 1% of the total acreage, ten acres, is burdened by the 
ESA. See R. at 4. 
IV. IF CORDELIA LOT IS THE PROPER PARCEL, MS. 
LEAR’S TAKING CLAIM IS STILL PRECLUDED 
BECAUSE THE ESA’S BURDENS ARE 
TEMPORARY LAND USE RESTRICTION AND 
INACTION BY THE LANDOWNER WILL CAUSE 
THE NATURAL DESTRUCTION OF THE KARNER 
BLUE’S HABITAT. 
Just as takings jurisprudence frowns upon the physical divi-
sion of the whole parcel, temporal divisions of permitted uses and 
rights associated with a parcel must be avoided. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 
U.S. at 327. This rule of thumb follows from the principle that, 
while a regulation may go too far, “where an owner possesses a full 
‘bundle’ of property rights, the destruction of one ‘strand’ of the 
bundle is not a taking.” Id. An interest in real property is not 
merely its physical and geographical scope, but also the “term of 
years that describes the temporal aspect of the owner’s interest.” 
Id. at 331-32 (citing Restatement of Property §§ 7-9 (1936)). Both 
the physical and temporal dimensions of property ownership must 
be considered in a takings analysis. Id. at 332. Accordingly, “a per-
manent deprivation of the owner’s use of the entire area is a taking 
of ‘the parcel as a whole,’ whereas a temporary restriction that 
merely causes a diminution in value is not.” Id. Because the ESA 
burdens land only so long as a species is alive or habitat is suitable, 
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it is a temporary restriction and not a categorical taking of all eco-
nomically productive use.9 
The rule prohibiting temporal division of an estate in real 
property for the purpose of a takings analysis stems from the Su-
preme Court’s 2002 decision in Tahoe-Sierra, which declared that 
a thirty-two-month moratorium on any form of construction or de-
velopment was not a taking. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. 302. The mor-
atorium in Tahoe-Sierra effectively prohibited any economic use or 
development of the affected properties for nearly two years. Id. at 
310-12. The owners remained free to alienate their property inter-
est and to exclude others from their property. Id. at 341-42. Once 
the moratorium was lifted, the value of the property returned to its 
prior level. Id. The holding of the Court in Tahoe-Sierra demon-
strated that temporary burdens on some sticks, but not all, within 
the bundle of property rights is not a categorical taking under Lu-
cas. Id. at 335. Quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 
393, 413 (1922), the Court noted that “government hardly could go 
on if to some extent values incident to property could not be dimin-
ished without paying for every such change in the general law.” Id. 
at 335. 
Under a plain reading of the ESA, as viewed through Tahoe-
Sierra, the statute restricts land use only as long as a species re-
mains listed. Once a species is listed as endangered, uses of the 
land that could constitute a “take” are restricted. 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1538(a)(1)(B). This includes the destruction of the species’ habi-
tat. However, when (1) a species recovers and is delisted, (2) a spe-
cies becomes extinct, or (3) a piece of property can no longer natu-
rally support the listed species, the ESA’s burdens disappear. See 
16 U.S.C. §§ 1533(a), (d); 1538. Stated differently, the ESA only 
burdens property while the species is alive and on the property, or 
so long as the property remains a viable habitat. The ESA also does 
 
9. The temporary diversion of water, pursuant to the ESA, to which a land-
owner claims a legal right can give rise to a compensable taking, however, in such 
cases courts have ruled that the diverse constituted a physical appropriation, not 
a regulatory taking. See, e.g., Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 543 F.3d 
1276, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that diversion of water from a canal to facil-
itate fish spawning is physical taking); Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. 
United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 319 (2001) (holding that diversions of water away 
from irrigation supplies to protect fish species is a physical taking). As such, these 
cases are distinguishable from the issue before the Court, which involves an al-
leged regulatory taking. 
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not restrict Ms. Lear’s ability to alienate her property or to con-
tinue using it for recreational or hunting purposes, as has been 
done historically. 
Should Ms. Lear choose so, the ESA will burden her property 
for no more than ten years. R. at 7. Immediate discontinuance of 
mowing will lead to the natural cessation of the Karner Blue habi-
tat, and thus, an automatic lifting of the restrictions without vio-
lating the ESA. Id. Accordingly, the § 9 restrictions, as applied to 
the Cordelia Lot, are analogous to a ten-year moratorium on devel-
opment. Such restrictions may still constitute a partial taking, un-
der framework of Pennsylvania Central Transport Co. v. New York 
City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). However, these restrictions are not a 
categorical taking under Lucas. Cf. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 
1478. As Ms. Lear did not argue for application of Pennsylvania 
Central below, see R. at 8, n. 3, this Court should not engage in 
such an analysis sua sponte. 
V. THE CORDELIA LOT RETAINS ECONOMIC 
VALUE AS RECREATIONAL LAND THAT CAN 
FETCH $1,000 PER YEAR IN RENT. 
Where a regulation deprives property of less than all econom-
ically beneficial use, a categorical taking cannot be sustained. Lu-
cas, 505 U.S. at 1015-16. Moreover, mere diminution in value, even 
if significant, is not deprivation of all economically beneficial use. 
Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 630-31. A categorical taking under Lucas 
only materializes in “the extraordinary circumstance when no pro-
ductive or economically beneficial use of land is permitted.” Tahoe-
Sierra, 535 U.S. at 330 (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016-17). 
The retention of some economic value, even if it is less than 
10% of what would be possible in the absence of regulation, pre-
cludes a categorical taking under Lucas. In Palazzolo, the plain-
tiff’s property was decreased in value by nearly 94%, as a direct 
result of the development restrictions imposed by regulation. Id. 
However, the Supreme Court held that because some portion of the 
parcel was still developable and the property retained some value, 
application of Lucas was precluded. Id. at 631-32. 
In the cases since Palazzolo, circuit courts have generally in-
terpreted Lucas as requiring complete and total loss of value to 
constitute a taking. See, e.g., Cienega Gardens v. United States, 331 
F.3d 1319, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding that Lucas requires loss 
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of “100% of a property interest’s value”); but see Bowles v. United 
States, 31 Fed. Cl. 37, 49 (1994) (holding that a 92% diminution in 
value was a per se taking under Lucas in the absence of other pos-
sible uses). Also, as discussed, the temporary suspension of an eco-
nomic use also precludes application of Lucas. See, e.g., Tahoe-Si-
erra, 535 U.S. at 330; Seiber v. United States, 364 F.3d 1356 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004). And, while purely speculative land uses and hypothet-
ical sales do not constitute the retention of reasonably economically 
beneficial use, Lost Tree Village Corp. v. United States, 787 F.3d 
1111, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2015), just as in Palazzolo, Ms. Lear retains 
a concrete interest in the property. 
The Cordelia Lot indisputably can produce at least $1,000 a 
year in annual rents until the ESA regulations become moot fol-
lowing ten years of discontinued mowing. R. at 7. This case is more 
similar to Lucas and Tahoe-Sierra than it is to Cienega Gardens. 
In Lucas, the plaintiff retained the ability to build at least one res-
idence on his lot, and the overall property retained about 7% of its 
potential developable value. In Tahoe-Sierra, while no economic 
use was possible during the moratorium, the property in question 
recovered 100% of its value when the moratorium lifted. Tahoe-
Sierra, 535 U.S at 331-32. Conversely, in Cienega Gardens, not 
only did the property lose over 90% of its market value, but no 
other uses were permitted on the property; thus, a categorical tak-
ing occurred. 331 F.3d at 1342-43. In addition to the right to sell 
the Cordelia Lot, Ms. Lear remains free to lease access to her prop-
erty for $1,000 a year. R. at 7. Under the Lucas doctrine, the ability 
to lease access to the property for cash, coupled with the temporary 
nature of the restrictions, precludes a taking under Lucas. As the 
Supreme Court has stated, the Lucas per se taking standard is re-
served for “extraordinary circumstances.” Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. 
at 331-32. 
Finally, this Court should not succumb to Ms. Lear’s attempt 
to analogize the magnitude of the deprivation in this case to that 
of Loveladies I. In that case, the Federal Claims Court concluded 
that the property decreased in value by 99% and that a compensa-
ble taking had occurred. Loveladies I, 21 Cl. Ct. at 161. Arguably, 
if one ignores the ten-year limitation on development restrictions 
in this case, one calculation would result in a 99% diminution in 
value. However, the temporal limit cannot be ignored under Tahoe-
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Sierra, 535 U.S. at 330. Further, Loveladies I and II are distin-
guishable because the court applied the Pennsylvania Central 
framework. Id. at 160-61. Ms. Lear waive a Pennsylvania Central 
challenge by failing to raise it below. See Goodwin v. C.N.J., Inc., 
436 F.3d 44, 51 (1st Cir. 2006). 
This Court should also refrain from the erroneous considera-
tion of property taxes engaged in by the district court. R. at 7. All 
property owners pay taxes, and such taxes have never been noted 
as a relevant factor in a Lucas analysis by any court. Property 
taxes have been paid on this property in the absence of any pro-
ductive economic use, since 1965, when agricultural production 
ceased. Further, if the value of the Cordelia Lot has decreased, a 
reassessment will lower the annual taxable value of the lot. Be-
cause the property can be put to economic use through a lease until 
habitat cessation lifts the regulations and property taxes are not a 
relevant consideration, the lot retains economic value. 
VI. BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY 
LAW, INCLUDING THE PUBLIC TRUST 
DOCTRINE AND THE EQUAL FOOTING 
DOCTRINE, PRECLUDE A TAKINGS CLAIM 
BASED THE DENIAL OF A WETLAND FILL 
PERMIT. 
The government is not required to compensate landowners for 
restrictive regulations that “inhere in the title itself;” meaning that 
such restrictions arise from preexisting “background principles of 
the [s]tate’s law of property and nuisance.” Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029; 
see also Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538 (2005). 
These background principles are not limited to common law nui-
sance. Cf. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1035 (Kennedy, J. concurring). The 
government’s navigational servitude over the submerged lands be-
neath and adjacent to navigable waters also precludes a takings 
claim, id. at 1029 (citing Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141 (1900)), 
because the landowner does not, in law, hold absolute title to the 
submerged lands. See PPL Mont., L.L.C v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 
589-90 (2012); see also Carson v. Blazer, 2 Binn. 475, 483 (Pa. 1810) 
(“The common law principle is . . . that the owners of the [river] 
banks have no right to the water of navigable rivers.”). Further-
more, pursuant to the equal-footing doctrine, “[u]pon statehood, 
the [s]tate gains title within its borders to the beds of waters then 
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navigable.” PPL Mont., 565 US at 591. Under either the public 
trust or equal-footing doctrine, any takings claim arising from the 
denial of the marshland fill permit is precluded. 
A. Ms. Lear Does Not Have Absolute Title to the 
Lands Beneath the Marsh, Which Are Held in 
Trust by the State of New Union For the Public. 
The public trust doctrine is an ancient body of law, under 
which “states retain residual power to determine the scope of the 
public trust over waters within their borders.” Id. at 604. The roots 
of this doctrine can be traced from Roman civilization, through 
English common law, and to the laws of the original thirteen 
states. Id. at 603; see also Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 18-26 
(1894) (summarizing the English common law and the incorpora-
tion of the public trust doctrine into the original colonies and 
states). While the doctrine is ultimately a matter of state law, it is 
generally understood that the state owns “all of its navigable wa-
terways and the lands lying beneath them as trustee of a public 
trust for the benefit of the people.” Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior 
Court, 658 P.2d 709, 718 (Cal. 1983) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Pursuant to this longstanding body of law, New Union 
and Brittain County, holds the submerged lands under Lear Is-
land’s cove as a trustee for the public. 
Colonies and States have applied the public trust doctrine to 
non-tidal rivers and lakes since this country’s founding. The dis-
trict court incorrectly cites the discussion in PPL Montana, L.L.C. 
v. Montana, 565 U.S. at 590, for the proposition that lands under 
non-tidal waterways were considered private property until 1810. 
R. at 10. While European common law did not recognize non-tidal 
waterways as navigable, most colonies and states rejected such a 
restrictive definition. See Carson, 2 Binn. at 483 (“The common-
law principle is in fact, that the owners of the banks have no right 
to the water of navigable rivers.”). The Carson court expressly rec-
ognized that the English definition of navigable waterway was in-
apposite in America. Id. Moreover, early colonies and later the 
states “dealt with the lands under the tide waters within [their] 
borders according to [their] own views of justice and policy,” and 
they reserved control over or granted rights to use of such lands 
according to the public’s interest. Shively, 152 U.S. at 26. 
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Predicting the exact scope of New Union’s public trust protec-
tions is outside this Court’s abilities on the current record, how-
ever, the Court should assume that such protections exist and are 
applicable. New Union was not a state at the time of the original 
grant, R. at 4, but the Supreme Court has recognized that the 
United States holds territorial lands in trust for future states. 
Shively, 152 U.S. at 30. Furthermore, the state of California, has 
led many others in applying public trust protections beyond mere 
navigation, commerce, and fishing, to include a wider scope of pub-
lic interests and to the tributaries of navigable waters. Nat’l Audu-
bon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 719. For example, in National Audubon So-
ciety, the California Supreme Court held that traditional navigable 
waters could be protected by restricting diversions of water in non-
navigable tributaries. Id. at 436-37. On the current record, this 
Court cannot know with absolute certainty that New Union’s pro-
tections are as extensive as California’s, but National Audubon So-
ciety and the history of the public trust doctrine demonstrate that 
New Union has the power to exercise such authority. Therefore, 
without evidence to the contrary, this Court should assume that 
Brittain County’s wetland regulation is a permissible exercise of 
its sovereign public trust power. 
B. Brittain County’s Wetland Regulations are a 
Lawful Exercise of Governmental Title to 
Underwater Lands Pursuant to the Equal-Footing 
Doctrine. 
Under the equal-footing doctrine, when a state enters the Un-
ion it “gains title within its borders to the beds of waters then nav-
igable . . .” as a matter of constitutional law. PPL Mont., 565 U.S. 
at 591. Once title is obtained, the state may regulate and allocate 
those lands, subject only to “the paramount power of the United 
States to control such waters for purposes of navigation in inter-
state and foreign commerce.” Id. When the United States acquires 
territorial lands by concession or treaty, it holds the navigable wa-
terways of those lands in trust for future states. Shively, 152 U.S. 
at 49-50. For a conveyance of territorial lands otherwise subject to 
the equal footing doctrine to be valid, this Court must find both 
that Congress intended to convey such lands and that it intended 
that conveyance to defeat the state’s later claim to title. United 
States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 41 (1997) (hereinafter “U.S. v. A.K.”). 
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For the purpose of the equal-footing doctrine, navigability is 
determined at the time of statehood on the basis of whether the 
waterway is “navigable in fact.” PPL Mont., 565 U.S. at 592. The 
Supreme Court’s four-part test originally held that waterways are 
navigable in fact if they are: 
used, or are susceptible of being used, [1] in their ordinary condi-
tion, [2] as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel 
are or may be conducted [3] in the customary modes of trade and 
travel on water . . . [4] when they form . . . by themselves, or by 
uniting with other waters, a continued highway over which com-
merce is or may be carried on. 
Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870). The Supreme Court 
later eliminated the “ordinary condition” requirement, recognizing 
that “[t]o appraise the evidence of navigability on the natural con-
dition only of the waterway is erroneous.” United States v. Appala-
chian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 407 (1940). In Daniel Ball, 
Grand River was navigable in fact because a steam ship could 
travel forty miles inland from Lake Michigan. Id. at 564. The pos-
sibility of use, not actual use, for navigation is determinative. Be-
cause the Lear Island cove is navigable in fact, and the 1803 grant 
did not supersede New Union’s claim to title, denying the fill per-
mit is not a taking. 
Lear Island’s cove is navigable in fact, despite the Army Corps 
of Engineers’ interpretation of the Rivers and Harbors Act. R. at 1-
2. Lake Union is an interstate lake that was, and still can be, used 
for interstate navigation. R. at 7. The portion of the cove that is 
now marshland was historically open waters and was used as a 
boat launch, and the cove remains contiguous with the lake. Id. 
Historically, ingress and egress to Lear Island was exclusively 
made by boat. Id. at 5. When New Union became a state the waters 
surrounding Lear Island, including the cove, were used or suscep-
tible to use “as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel 
are or may be conducted.” Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) at 563. 
Therefore, the cove was navigable in fact when New Union became 
a state making it subject to the equal footing doctrine. 
An analogous case is Shively v. Bowlby, where Congress 
granted petitioners land through the Oregon Donation Act, which 
was bound on the north by the Columbia River. Shively, 152 U.S. 
28https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol8/iss1/3
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at 8. At issue was whether the grant rightfully included lands un-
der the surface of the Columbia’s waters. The Court held that Con-
gress has the power to grant titled to lands below the high-water 
mark of navigable waters in territories: 
[W]henever it becomes necessary to do so in order to perform in-
ternational obligations, or to effect the improvement of such lands 
for the promotion and convenience of commerce with foreign na-
tions and among the several States, or to carry out other public 
purposes appropriate to the objects for which the United States 
hold the Territory. 
Id. at 48 (emphasis added). However, it was also recognized that 
Congress does not typically do so by general laws, and that in the 
absence of “international duty or public necessity,” Congress has 
left the administration of such lands to the states. Id. at 58. The 
following justification was proffered by the Court: 
Territories acquired by Congress, whether by deed of cession from 
the original States, or by treaty with a foreign country, are held 
with the object, as soon as their population and condition justify 
it, of being admitted into the Union as States, upon an equal foot-
ing with the original States in all respects; and the title and do-
minion of the tide waters and the lands under them are held by 
the United States for the benefit of the whole people, and . . . “in 
trust for the future States.” 
Id. at 49. Thus, congressional grants of public lands bordered by 
navigable waters convey to private individuals “no title or right be-
low the high water mark, and do not impair the title and dominion 
of the future State.”10 Id. at 58. Accordingly, the Court held that 
the general grant under the Oregon Donation Act did not include 
title to subsurface lands. Id. at 58. 
While Congress has the power to expressly grant title to sub-
merged lands to private parties, the Lear grant is invalid as to sim-
ilar lands because no proper purpose was offered. See U.S. v. A.K., 
521 U.S. at 38-39 (“the purpose of a conveyance or reservation is a 
critical factor in determining federal intent”). In U.S. v. A.K., the 
 
10. This principle was affirmed in United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 
49, 58 (1926), where the Court held that the setting aside of the Red Lake Reser-
vation prior to Minnesota becoming a state did not convey title to the subsurface 
lands absent express intent to do so.  
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Court specifically stated that  
“the only constitutional limitation on a conveyance or reservation 
of submerged lands is that it serve[s] an appropriate public pur-
pose.” Id. at 40. The express reservation of submerged lands con-
taining oil deposits furthered the public purpose of “securing an oil 
supply for national defense.” Id. at 41. Thus, reserving the lands 
satisfied the first prong, and the second prong was met because the 
public purpose at issue required the federal government to have 
superior title. Id. 
Because the United States holds territorial subsurface lands 
in trust for later states, any conveyance of title to such lands should 
not be valid unless the transfer is for a public purpose. In the pre-
sent case, the first prong is not contested, as the plain language of 
the grant expresses an intent to convey the submerged lands sur-
rounding Lear Island. R. at 4-5. However, because there is no indi-
cation of any public purpose served by the conveyance to a private 
party, this transfer should not be presumed to defeat the state’s 
traditional right to superior title under the second prong. See U.S. 
v. A.K., 521 U.S. at 34. Congressional intent to defeat the state’s 
claim to title is required for conveyances of title to private parties, 
just as it is for federal reservation. 
While the public purpose requirement has not been specifically 
applied to private conveyances, the same policy concerns that arise 
in federal reservation compel its application here. Id. at 5 
(“[O]wnership of submerged lands—which carries with it the 
power to control navigation, fishing, and other public uses of wa-
ter—is an essential attribute of sovereignty.”). Lake Union is a 
navigable interstate body of water. New Union has a strong inter-
est in maintaining ownership over all lands laying beneath the 
lake in order to control navigation and other uses. Moreover, no 
interest of the Lears in 1803, nor today, would be harmed by find-
ing that the conveyance bestowed something less than fee simple 
absolute title to the lands under the lake. At the time of convey-
ance, the waters surrounding Lear Island were merely needed for 
ingress and egress from the island. The Lears have never raised 
any concern regarding mineral rights or any other need for strict 
ownership of the subsurface land. Conversely, the state retains a 
high interest in the need to control navigation, protect sensitive 
ecological habitats, and regulate construction of structures extend-
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ing over the lake. Simply put, there would have been no public pur-
pose served, nor was one stated, in the 1803 grant that challenged 
New Union’s presumed claim to title. In the absence of a public 
purpose, it should not be inferred that Congress intended to defeat 
the future states claim to title of all lands under Lake Union upon 
achieving statehood. See Id. at 34. 
VII. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY APPLYING 
TORT PRINCIPLES OF JOINT AND SEVERAL 
LIABILITY TO MULTIPLE LAYERS OF 
REGULATION THAT AFFECT DIFFERENT 
RIGHTS AND PORTIONS OF THE PROPERTY. 
The district court erred when it applied Ms. Lear’s novel the-
ory of joint and several liability to this takings claim involving mul-
tiple government actors. Similar to a claim for tortious liability, to 
establish a taking a plaintiff must prove that the government’s ac-
tion or regulation was the actual and proximate cause of the injury. 
See Cary v. United States, 79 Fed. Cl. 145, 147 (2007) (discussing 
plaintiff’s burden of proof for an inverse condemnation claim). 
However, unlike a tortious actor, the government is not a tres-
passer or wrongful actor. See Halverson v. Skagit Cty., 983 P.2d 
643, 649 (Wash. 1999). While joint and several liability arises from 
the interest of ensuring that wrongfully injured parties can recover 
from those who contributed to a foreseeable indivisible harm, Vel-
sicol Chemical Corp. v. Rowe, 543 S.W.2d 337, 342 (Tenn. 1976), 
compensation for takings is a one-for-one exchange of money for a 
property interest acquired through lawful authority. Lingle., 544 
U.S. at 536; see also Jan G. Laitos & Teresa Helms Abel, The Role 
of Causation When Determining the Proper Defendant in a Takings 
Lawsuit, 20 Wm. & Mary Bill of Rts. J. 1181, 1198 (2012). 
It would be a mistake for this Court to apply the tort theory of 
joint and several liability to the present case for three reasons. 
First, the policy concerns justifying compensation in tort law and 
takings law are fundamentally different. Second, the only court to 
previously consider this novel theory rejected it in the takings con-
text. Third, even if joint and several liability applies, the alleged 
injury is not indivisible, and thus not fit for joint liability. 
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A. Joint Liability Punishes Bad Actors and Should 
Not be Applied to the Lawful Actions of 
Government. 
Joint liability is only proper in contexts where compensation 
is due for an indivisible injury caused by an unlawful act. Joint 
liability in tort law arises from the circumstances where multiple 
wrongful actors, acting either in concert or independently, produce 
an injury that cannot be factually or legally apportioned amongst 
the actors. See Velsicol, 543 S.W.2d at 342-43. This rule has been 
expanded to include concurrent wrongful acts that produce a simi-
larly indivisible injury, such as multiple nuisances. Id. at 343. 
However, the justification for joint liability is to avoid “putting on 
the [wrongfully] injured party the impossible burden of proving the 
specific shares of harm done by each defendant.” Id. 
Conversely, compensation in the Fifth Amendment context is 
a recognition that the government has the lawful authority to seize 
private property for public use, but when that authority is exer-
cised the owner must be compensated. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 536-37. 
The purpose of requiring compensation is to prevent the “[g]overn-
ment from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, 
in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a 
whole.” Id. at 537. In the tort context, joint liability serves as a 
punishment to ensure that bad actors do not escape liability. No 
such punishment is necessary in takings law, as the government is 
a lawful actor. While individuals should not have to privately fund 
public improvements, courts should not dissuade governments 
from furthering public interests through their police powers. 
B. This Court Should Follow the Washington 
Supreme Court and Reject the Novel Application 
of Joint and Several Liability to Takings Claims. 
Nearly twenty years ago, the Supreme Court of Washington 
declined to apply the “acting in concert” theory of joint liability in 
a reverse condemnation proceeding, Halverson, 983 P.2d at 650, 
and this Court should do the same with the variety of joint liability 
proposed by Ms. Lear. In Halverson, the plaintiff alleged that the 
county was jointly and severally liable for levee-induced flooding 
because it acted in concert with the diking districts to divert flood-
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water over plaintiff’s property. Id. at 647. However, the diking dis-
tricts were statutorily and legally separate entities from the 
county; the levee system was created independently of the county 
and was not owned by the county. Id. at 647-48. Plaintiff sought to 
recover based on the difference in value between damage that ac-
tually occurred, as compared with what would have occurred with-
out the system; essentially, damages arising from the existence of 
the levee system. Id. at 650. The court held that even if the county 
repaired the system, this concert action was insufficient to satisfy 
the causal element of a reverse condemnation claim, and it refused 
to extend the proposed tort theory to such a claim. Id. This Court 
should similarly hold that application of the tort concept of joint 
and several liability is inappropriate in the context of a takings 
claim involving multiple layers of regulation associated with le-
gally and factually independent government entities. 
C. Any Alleged Injury Caused by the Combination of 
State and Federal Regulation Is Severable Making 
Joint Liability Inappropriate. 
No federal regulations prevent Ms. Lear from filling or devel-
oping the marshland of Lear Island cove, and therefore, the FWS 
has not deprived her property of all economic value. A key justifi-
cation for joint and several liability is that the injury is indivisible. 
The Velsicol court framed the concept as follows: 
Where the tortious acts of two or more wrongdoers join to produce 
an indivisible injury, that is, an injury which cannot be appor-
tioned with reasonable certainty to the individual wrongdoers, all 
of the wrongdoers will be held jointly and severally liable for the 
entire damages and the injured party may proceed to judgment 
against any one separately or against all in one suit. 
543 S.W.2d at 342-43 (emphasis added). When the alleged injury 
can be easily apportioned among actors, joint and severable liabil-
ity is inappropriate. 
The impacts of the regulations on Ms. Lear’s property can be 
apportioned to the respective governing entities and to the prop-
erty rights they affect. The restrictions imposed by the ESA do not 
apply to the cove because the marshlands are not critical habitat 
for the Karner Blue and because no federal approval is required. 
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R. at 1-3. No federal laws prevent the proposed filling or develop-
ment of the cove. Id. Similarly, the Brittain County wetland regu-
lation does not burden any use of the above water portions of the 
property on which the Karner Blue resides. Id. The regulations 
burden different property rights and parts of the property in a dis-
tinctive manner. 
The FWS, nor any other federal agency, can control the local 
regulatory policies of Brittain County that exceed minimum fed-
eral requirements. As in Halverson, no action of the FWS is a direct 
or proximate cause of any taking associated with the County’s de-
nial of a fill permit. Any alleged burden caused by the ESA is asso-
ciated only with the above water portions of the Cordelia Lot. Like-
wise, any burden imposed by the county regulation affect only the 
submerged portions of the parcel. Thus, even assuming that joint 
and several liability applies to Fifth Amendment takings claims, 
joint liability is inappropriate because the alleged harm is severa-
ble. 
 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant–Appellant–Cross Appel-
lee, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, respectfully re-
quests that this Court affirm the district court’s holding regarding 
the constitutionality of the ESA and reverse the district court’s 
holdings that Ms. Lear’s Fifth Amendment takings claim is ripe 
and that a compensable taking has occurred. 
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